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JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter as it 
is an appeal from the Third District Court of the State of Utah 
according to Utah Code Ann. Sec. 78-2a-3(2(g (1987). 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from an order entered by Judge David Young 
of the Third District Court in December, 1989 in which the property 
of the parties was divided equitably, according to the terms of a 
constructive trust which was created between the parties. 
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STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Were the findings of fact, conclusions of law and decree 
of the District Court fair, equitable, and based upon the evidence 
presented such that the determination that the parties1 assets 
should be divided pursuant to the terms of a constructive trust 
is not an abuse of discretion? 
2. Was the law relating to constructive trusts correctly 
applied in this matter such that the judgment of the Trial Court 
should stand? 
3. Is this appeal frivolous, given the prior decision of the 
Court of Appeals, which adopted no arguments presented by the 
appellant which would eliminate any award to the respondent, but 
merely indicated that a different legal theory should be used to 
characterize the division of those assets? 
4. Should the respondent be awarded her reasonable attorney's 
fees and costs incurred in this matter, due to the repetitive 
nature of the appellant's arguments, and the frivolousness of this 
appeal? 
ISSUES AS PRESENTED BY THE APPELLANT 
5. Is the relationship between appellant and respondent best 
described as a constructive trust? 
6. Should not the relationship be best described as a joint 
venture falling under the partnership rules? 
7. Can a constructive trust be claimed with limited evidence 
in support? 
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8.Can a constructive trust be dissolved, rather than created 
and enforced by law. 
9.1s a constructive trust created to prohibit unjust 
enrichment? 
10. Can plaintiff's admitted statement be ignored? 
11. Is not the written statement an accord and satisfaction 
t all claims respondent may bring forth later. 
12. Is not plaintiff barred by statutory time limit to attack 
validity of argument? 
13. Now that plaintiff's common-law marriage has been 
rejected, is it necessary to include third parties in this action? 
14. Should the plaintiff be compelled to amend her complaint 
to state a cause of action so the defendant may make an affirmative 
defense? 
15. Can the respondent place all liabilities on appellant's 
property? 
16. Did the trial court err in granting plaintiff's motion 
for distribution of funds after notice of appeal was filed? 
17. What are the best interests of the parties' handicapped 
child which is not over 18? 
18. Should the respondent be unjustly enriched by confusing 
the source and failing to keep records? 
19. Should plaintiff be rewarded after filing federal 
statements of limited assets to receive grants? 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
None 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the case. This is an appeal from an order entered 
by Judge David Young of the Third District Court in December, 1989, 
which terminated the relationship of the parties and equitably 
divided their joint assets pursuant to the legal theory of 
constructive trust. 
Course of the proceedings. This appeal is from a final order 
of Judge David Young of the Third District Court. The Plaintiff 
filed a complaint for divorce on October 14, 1983. The trial in 
this matter was held on June 9, 1987. The Plaintiff and Defendant 
presented witnesses and testimony of both of them was taken, and 
closing arguments were heard. The Trial Court determined that the 
parties relationship was a common-law marriage, and he equiitably 
divided the parties1 assets. 
The defendant appealed, and received a decision dated July 
5, 1989, which indicated that the parties1 relationship was not a 
common-law marriage. The decision did suggest several other legal 
theories which might apply. 
The plaintiff then filed proposed findings of fact, 
conclusions of law, and order dividing the parties1 assets pursuant 
to a constructive trust, which was approved by the court in 
December, 1989. 
The defendant then filed this appeal. 
Disposition in the trial court. The Trial Court found that 
the parties relationship was a constructive trust, based upon the 
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confidential nature of the parties1 relationship, and the 
substantial unjust enrichment which would occur if the defendant 
were allowed to retain all of the parties1 assets. 
Statement of material facts. Plaintiff, Helen Layton, 
hereinafter known as "Helen" and the Defendant, Donald Layton, 
hereinafter known as "Don" met in 1946 when Helen was fifteen 
(T57,L17) years old. After about two years, Helen began to work 
with Don cutting down trees, before and after her other job 
(T58,L7). In 1952, at age 20 she became pregnant, and went to 
California (T59,L2) for a time, but returned to Utah and lived with 
Don's parents until the baby (the parties1 son Robert), was born 
on November 6, 1952 (T59,L11). Helen then lived with her parents 
until 1954. During this time, Helen and Don felled trees for a 
living. With the money they earned, she and Don bought a fire 
damaged house located at Banks Court in Salt Lake City (T59,L14), 
and worked together to make it habitable, and in 1954 Helen and 
young Robert moved in (T60,L19). Don moved in a short time later. 
Don and Helen intended to get married, and even purchased a 
marriage license, but they "never got around" to getting married 
(T61,L22). 
The parties continued to work together, felling trees and 
demolishing houses for income. They began purchasing real property 
at tax sales, and bought a number of parcels, and one five acre 
parcel which was located at 33 00 South and Wasatch Boulevard was 
purchased for the sum of $6,666.66 which was paid in $1,000 per 
year installments (T62,L25). In approximately 1961 that property 
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was sold for the sum of $40,000.00 and the parties used those funds 
to purchase further properties. 
Helen always participated in the choice of property and the 
negotiations for price and terms of each purchase. Over the years, 
some parcels have been sold or condemned by various government 
agencies, and the proceeds from those sales have always been used 
to pay expenses for the family, the properties, or to purchase 
further parcels. 
From 1954 until 1980 the parties supported themselves from 
the earnings of the properties, the sale of raspberries and other 
fruit tended and picked by them, from tree felling, and demolition 
work. Neither party had regular full time employment for a third 
person. Helen worked alongside Don on a full time basis, even when 
pregnant with their three subsequent children (T63,L10). The only 
time she did not work an equal amount with Don was when Angie (born 
in 1962) and Michael (born in 1964) were very small, but as soon 
as they were in school she resumed roofing, painting, and otherwise 
managing the parties' properties. She also did all of the 
bookkeeping for the family, which was a considerable amount of 
work, during those years. 
Helen and Don held themselves out to all who knew them as a 
married couple (T27,L18) (T20,L3) (T12,L25) (T37,L25), and the real 
property purchased by them reflects both of their names. The 
parcels which do not reflect joint ownership which Helen claims 
should be awarded to her are titled in Don's name alone due to an 
oversight. The parties had no funds which were not joint, and all 
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property purchased during that time should be (and most were) 
placed in joint names. 
The parties had a joint bank account (T64,L2), in the name 
of Don or Helen Layton and they filed joint income tax returns each 
year (T63,L24). All income from their various pursuits was used 
to support themselves, their children, and the properties, and 
there is no indication that there was any division of any of the 
real or personal property of the parties along the lines of "yours" 
or "mine" during the history of the parties prior to their 
difficulties and final separation. 
In early 1971 Danny was born afflicted with Down's Syndrome, 
and the parties troubles began. Helen was asked to leave the 
parties' residence in 1976 (T67,L1), and was gone for three months, 
but moved back to the family residence at Banks Court in October 
of that year. In early 1977 Helen again moved out (T67,L6), this 
time for four months, and then again moved back to Banks Court (the 
family residence). During this separation Helen had no outside 
job, and continued to do what she could to further the family 
business. 
In November of 1979 Helen went to California (T70,L5) and did 
obtain employment there. She returned in April of 1980 to file a 
joint income tax return with Don, as the parties had done since 
approximately 1954. In May of that year, Don purchased the house 
at Villa Drive, "for Helen." (T50,L8) She returned to Utah in May 
and moved into the house. Helen obtained employment with Gem State 
Mutual Insurance Company in the Fall of 1980, and her earnings went 
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to pay the household expenses on the Villa Drive house (T71,L25), 
along with whatever else was needed. During this time she still 
worked to care for the properties on weekends and evenings (took 
her vacation to pick raspberries) and the parties still lived 
together and held themselves out to be husband and wife. Don 
lived at Banks Court for a few months after May of 1980, but 
eventually he moved to the Villa Drive house and the parties lived 
together until 1983 (T72,L7). Helen left the Villa Drive house in 
1983 and filed this action. 
Don has had the full management and control of all of the 
parties1 properties, both real and personal, since the filing of 
this action. He has had the personal use and enjoyment of all of 
the income from the property, and he has had the burden of caring 
for the property, but he has not paid all of the property taxes 
and assessments which are outstanding against the real property of 
the parties. The income from the properties is approximately 
$32,000 per year, and the property taxes are approximately §12,000 
per year, leaving a difference of $22,000 per year for living 
expenses and any other expenses required for the property. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. The findings and decree of the Trial Court are supported 
by the evidence and are not an abuse of discretion. The Plaintiff 
presented evidence that she and the Defendant had a continuous, if 
sometimes stormy, relationship from 1954 until 1983. Witnesses and 
documents presented into evidence proved that the parties' 
relationship was of the type contemplated by the cases regarding 
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constructive trust, as the defendant was holding assets which in 
equity and good conscience should be possessed by the plaintiff, 
due to their long relationship and the absence of separate funds 
between them. 
A great injustice would occur if the defendant were allowed 
to retain all of the parties1 assets, almost all of which are held 
in joint name, which represented the fruit of both parties1 
lifetime of work and effort. 
The Defendant at trial, or since the decision of the Court of 
Appeals, has refused to provide any evidence or argument as to the 
fairness or lack thereof of the proposed property settlement, other 
than to allege that the Plaintiff should receive nothing. The 
Plaintiff produced an extensive exhibit of the properties, showing 
their locations, tax valuations, purchase prices, and including 
photographs, if relevant. The Plaintiff stated under oath that she 
would agree that the Defendant could receive either side of the 
list dividing the property prepared by her. The Defendant has never 
presented any evidence that the division according to that list was 
unfair. Accordingly, the division was equitable, and the Court did 
not abuse its discretion in finding that the relationship between 
the parties consisted of a constructive trust, which should now be 
dissolved. There is no need for further evidentiary hearing or 
amendment of pleadings, as the evidence at trial was complete, and 
adequately addressed the issues presented by the theory of 
constructive trust as well as the legal theories actually presented 
at trial. In any event, the defendant did not object to the 
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Court's determination that a constructive trust existed between the 
parties, and accordingly should not be allowed to do so now. 
2. The law relating to constructive trusts was correctly 
applied in this matter such that the judgment of the Trial Court 
should stand. The theory of constructive trust requires a 
confidential relationship between the parties, and an inequity 
which would result if one of the parties were allowed to retain 
assets as a result of the confidential relationship, to the 
detriment of the other party. Such a relationship existed here, 
and accordingly, the law was correctly applied. 
3. This appeal is frivolous, given the prior decision of 
the Court of Appeals, which adopted none of the arguments presented 
by the appellant other than to indicate that an incorrect legal 
theory had been applied. The appellant failed to object to the 
legal theory adopted by the Trial Court, and cannot now find fault 
with it. In his own brief filed herein, he does not present any 
new arguments resulting from the choice of legal theory, and he 
merely rehashes the same arguments he made in his prior appeal. 
4. The respondent should be awarded her reasonable 
attorney's fees and costs incurred in this matter, due to the 
repetitive nature of the appellant's arguments, and the 
frivolousness of this appeal. The appellant failed to file a 
supersedeas bond in this matter, yet the mere existence of this 
appeal has prevented the respondent from selling any of the 
property awarded to her to raise badly needed cash. To compound 
that injury, she has been forced to expend her meager funds to pay 
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attorney's fees to respond to yet another appeal in this matter. 
ARGUMENT 
1. THE FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND ORDER OF 
THE DISTRICT COURT ARE FAIR, EQUITABLE, AND BASED UPON THE EVIDENCE 
PRESENTED AT TRIAL SUCH THAT THIS JUDGMENT IS NOT AN ABUSE OF 
DISCRETION. 
Don and Helen have lived together for 19 years, raised four 
children, and amassed a sizeable estate of real and personal 
property. They held themselves out to be married, and lived as 
though they were. The property of the parties represents their 
life's work, and neither of them had any other. With rare 
exception, the assets held by them were in their joint names. 
This conduct has created a constructive trust between them, due to 
their confidential relationship. Don offered to be a husband and 
father, and Helen accepted by being a wife and mother and both 
expected to share equally in the profits of their life's work. At 
no time did Helen intend to transfer all of her assets to Don for 
his benefit alone. Now the constructive trust can no longer 
continue due to the parties1 inability to work together and Donfs 
attempted appropriation of all of them. The assets acquired by the 
parties have been divided using the equitable principles created 
by a constructive trust, and Don should not be allowed to 
appropriate all of the parties1 assets for himself for the sole 
reason that the parties were not legally married. 
In Ashton vs. Ashton, 733 P.2d 147 (Utah 1987), The Utah 
Supreme Court found that a confidential relationship existed 
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between the parties when one party conveyed his interest in real 
property to his brother, with the oral agreement that grantee would 
reconvey the property when grantor's marital problems were 
resolved. When grantee refused to reconvey the property, the 
lawsuit ensued. The Court created a constructive trust, and 
ordered reconveyance of the property. 
In this matter, Helen has placed almost all of her assets in 
joint name with Don, based upon their confidential relationship, 
without which she would not have done so. Don has produced no 
evidence that he had any separate funds during the time the 
property was acquired, and Helen has not asked for any assets 
acquired by Don after this matter was filed. Now Don seeks to have 
all of the assets for himself, and the Trial Court has refused to 
allow him to retain those assets, and has equitably divided them 
between the parties. 
Without the Court's aid, Helen would receive nothing from a 
lifetime of work, and Don would receive all of this property, even 
though it was not acquired by his efforts alone. At no time during 
the course of this action has Helen claimed that Don is not 
entitled to an equitable division of approximately one-half of the 
parties' assets. 
The Court should ratify the parties' 19 year constructive 
trust, and should let stand the decision of the Trial Court. 
2. THE LAW RELATING TO CONSTRUCTIVE TRUSTS WAS CORRECTLY 
APPLIED IN THIS MATTER SUCH THAT THE JUDGMENT OF THE TRIAL COURT 
SHOULD STAND. 
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The legal theory of constructive trust requires the 
following: 
1. A confidential relationship between the parties, and, 
2. Unjust enrichment which would result if one of the parties 
were allowed to retain assets as a result of the confidential 
relationship, to the detriment of the other party, Matter of Estate 
of Hock. 655 P.2d 1111 (Utah 1982). 
In Mattes vs. Olearain, 759 P.2d 1177 (Utah App. 1988), the 
Utah Court of Appeals overturned a trial court finding of common-
law marriage and a constructive trust. That case differs from this 
matter in several respects. 
First, the parties in Mattes lived together for only two 
years. In this matter they lived together for 19 years. 
Second, the parties in Mattes had their own separate sources 
of income, where in this matter for 19 years the parties only 
sources of income were their own joint labor in their joint 
enterprises. 
Third, in Mattes, the "wife" was seeking to overturn her 
execution of a valid deed granting title to the "husband" in his 
name alone. In this matter, Helen is seeking an equitable division 
of a great deal of real and personal property, almost all of which 
is already held in joint name, and all of which was obtained by 
joint funds, so that the validity of her claim is much more clear 
than in Mattes. 
Fourth, Judge Orme in his concurring opinion in Mattes, 
indicates that the "wife" could have retained the property on the 
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theory of a resulting trust rather than a constructive trust. He 
states that a resulting trust arises from the failure of an express 
trust, with full performance of an express trust, and payment of 
the purchase price for property by one, but put in the name of 
another. This theory could also apply to this matter, if the 
Appeals Court should so determine. 
The Utah Supreme Court has required that the doctrine of 
confidential relationship requires an inequality between the 
parties. In this matter, the parties lived as equal partners for 
most of their 19 years together, but there was evidence presented 
at trial which indicates that, toward the end, Don did exercise 
domination over Helen, and that he at one time shot at her with a 
gun. However, it is his refusal to give her any of the income from 
the properties, or allow her to sell or otherwise share in them 
after the separation of the parties, which creates his position of 
superiority which, by the time he began to exercise it, made it 
impossible for Helen to get out of this relationship with any of 
her assets. 
There has been no evidence presented that Don did more work 
or provided more funds than Helen. There are no citations to the 
record by Don to indicate that such evidence was presented at 
trial, or that the Trial Court refused to accept that evidence. 
Don has provided no compelling argument to indicate any argument 
which would justify awarding him all of the parties1 assets. 
A clearly gross inequity would result if Don was allowed to 
retain all of the parties1 assets merely because they were not 
16 
legally married• Helen would never had pooled her labor and assets 
with Don if she had believed that Don would ultimately be the sole 
owner of all of those assets, while she received nothing. It was 
this reliance, and Don's appropriation of those assets for himself, 
which created the confidential relationship between them. Their 
joint efforts obtained those assets, and if they can no longer work 
together, those assets should be equitably divided between them so 
they can go their separate ways. The Trial Court did exactly that, 
and the assets have been equitably divided between the parties. 
3. THIS APPEAL IS FRIVOLOUS, GIVEN THE PRIOR DECISION OF THE 
COURT OF APPEALS. 
In the prior decision in this matter, the Court of Appeals 
adopted none of the arguments presented by the appellant other than 
to indicate that an incorrect legal theory had been applied. The 
appellant failed to object to the legal theory adopted by the Trial 
Court, and cannot now find fault with it. In his own brief filed 
herein, he does not present any new arguments resulting from the 
choice of legal theory, and he merely rehashes the same arguments 
he made in his prior appeal. 
4 . THE RESPONDENT SHOULD BE AWARDED HER REASONABLE ATTORNEY f S 
FEES AND COSTS INCURRED IN THIS MATTER. 
The respondent should be awarded her reasonable attorney's 
fees and costs incurred in this matter, due to the repetitive 
nature of the appellant's arguments, and the frivolousness of this 
appeal. The appellant failed to file a supersedeas bond in this 
matter, yet the mere existence of this appeal has prevented the 
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respondent from selling any of the property awarded to her to raise 
badly needed cash. To compound that injury, she has been forced 
to expend her meager funds to pay attorney fs fees to respond to yet 
another appeal in this matter. Appellant has expended no funds for 
his attorney, as he is representing himself, and his part of the 
assets are not in dispute, so he is free to transfer them as he 
sees fit. During the pendency of this appeal, the appellant has 
paid none of the funds ordered by the Trial Court to the 
respondent, including the child support ordered. In light of all 
of these factors, the respondent should be awarded her reasonable 
attorneys fees and costs as set forth in the affidavit attached 
hereto. 
5. RESPONSE TO APPELLANT'S ISSUES PRESENTED IN HIS BRIEF, 
WHICH RESPONDENT FEELS ARE EITHER NOT RELEVANT, OR WERE ALREADY 
PRESENTED IN THE PRIOR APPEAL AND FOUND TO BE WITHOUT MERIT: 
5. Is the relationship between appellant and respondent best 
described as a constructive trust? 
This issue has been addressed above. 
6. Should not the relationship be best described as a joint 
venture falling under the partnership rules? 
Don does not present any argument regarding this issue, but 
it would appear that if this were a partnership, that the result 
would be the same, with the most relevant feature being that Don 
would not retain all of the parties' assets, and those assets would 
be divided between the parties as part of the partnership 
dissolution. 
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7. Can a constructive trust be claimed with limited evidence 
in support? 
No, but in this matter, there is ample evidence in the record 
to support the finding that the parties' relationship was governed 
by a constructive trust, and that the assets of the parties were 
correctly and equitably divided. 
8. Can a constructive trust be dissolved, rather than created 
and enforced by law. 
Yes. The constructive trust is created by the relationship 
of the parties, and if the relationship deteriorates such that one 
party is attempting to appropriate all of the assets for himself, 
then the Court can find that the trust exists, and then dissolve 
it, equitably dividing the assets contained therein. 
9. Is a constructive trust created to prohibit unjust 
enrichment? 
Yes. Don is attempting to unjustly enrich himself at Helen's 
expense, and the constructive trust is created to prevent that 
unjust enrichment. 
10. Can plaintiff's admitted statement be ignored? 
See next issue. 
11. Is not the written statement an accord and satisfaction 
to all claims respondent may bring forth later. 
Don has presented to the Court on numerous occasions, and did 
present at the trial in this matter, a copy of a handwritten 
statement which Helen admits she wrote, which states that "I hereby 
relinquish all claim to all property in the name of Don and Helen 
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Layton." 
Don claims that this is a binding contract, and that it 
eliminates all claims Helen has to any of the parties1 real or 
personal property. 
This statement was found to be invalid by the Trial Court for 
a number of reasons. It is only written by Helen Layton, not 
signed by her. It does not have a date. Most importantly, it does 
not describe the property in question. It is not clear whether she 
contemplated transferring the rights to a TV set, a car, or all of 
these many parcels of real property. At the time this statement 
was made, Helen was an experienced buyer of real estate and had 
executed many deeds and other contracts. She knew that real and 
personal property could not be transferred by such a statement, and 
that to effect this statement she would have to sign quit-claim 
deeds to all of the jointly held property. Helen knew that to 
transfer title to automobiles that her signature on the title would 
be necessary. Most of all, she knew that if she was coerced into 
making the statement, that along with these other problems, the 
statement would have no legal significance whatsoever. 
This statement was written sometime in the 1970's, during 
which time the parties continued to live together, and although 
their personal relationship was deteriorating, their business 
relationship did not materially change during this time. At no 
time did they behave as though this statement was a binding 
agreement by executing quit-claim deeds, automobile titles, or 
other bills of sale. 
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Because of these defects in the statement, and the actions of 
the parties in failing to ratify or act as though the statement was 
a valid contract, or an accord and satisfaction, and the statement 
is exactly that and no more. It is not a contract, and it does not 
transfer any property from one party to the other. 
12. Is not plaintiff barred by statutory time limit to attack 
validity of agreement? 
No, because the agreement was not valid, and thus was not 
governed by the statute of limitations. Also, this argument was 
not made at trial, and is now barred. 
13. Now that plaintifffs common-law marriage has been 
rejected, is it necessary to include third parties in this action? 
No. The defendant has orally complained of the failure of 
the court to include third parties to this action. However, Helen 
included the only other person whose name was contained on the 
titles of the property in question. She knew of no other person 
who was a partner, who had shared in profits, or who had an 
interest in these assets. Accordingly, she did not need to name 
third parties. Don could have made a motion to include the third 
parties anytime during the four years it took to get this matter 
to trial, but he failed to do so, and it is far too late for him 
to attempt to do so now. 
14. Should the plaintiff be compelled to amend her complaint 
to state a cause of action so the defendant may make an affirmative 
defense? 
No. The defenses to a claim of constructive trust are exactly 
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the same as the defenses which either were presented, or should 
have been presented if Don were a better attorney• Don has had an 
ample opportunity to have his position heard, and there is no need 
for an amended complaint or new trial in this matter when all of 
the relevant evidence is already on the record herein. 
15. Can the respondent place all liabilities on appellant's 
property? 
Yes. The trial court required Don to pay the property taxes 
and assessments which accrued during the time he along was managing 
the property, because Don received all of the income from the 
properties during the same time period, and this was correct. 
16. Did the trial court err in granting plaintiff's motion 
for distribution of funds after notice of appeal was filed? 
No. Don failed to file a motion for stay or a supersedeas 
bond in this matter, and accordingly, he cannot prevent the sale 
of any property or asset pending appeal. 
17. What are the best interests of the parties' handicapped 
child which is not over 18? 
Child custody was not an issue in the original trial, and now 
that the child is over 18, his care is a new issue, which should 
be dealt with in an appropriate forum, which is not this appeal. 
18. Should the respondent be unjustly enriched by confusing 
the source and failing to keep records? 
No. However, Helen did keep good records. The only party 
who has failed to keep records is Don, who appeared at court with 
a shoe box containing the records from the time of his sole 
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management of the property, and it is Don who refused to respond 
to discovery sent by Helen. All of the records Don attempted to 
admit at trial were objected to by Helen on the grounds that Don 
had not produced those records pursuant to discovery, and 
accordingly could not produce them at trial. None of those records 
indicated that any other person had an interest in the property, 
or that Don had purchased any of the property with joint funds. 
19. Should plaintiff be rewarded after filing federal 
statements of limited assets to receive grants? 
At trial Don presented an application filled out by Helen for 
college aid for the parties1 daughter. In that application, Helen 
indicated that she did not have substantial assets. The 
application was filled out while the matter was pending, and Don 
was claiming to be the sole owner of those assets. Helen, having 
no guarantee she would ever receive any asset out of this matter, 
did not feel she could claim ownership of those assets at that 
time, since their ownership was in dispute. 
The application was merely a statement of the facts at that 
time, and was not found by the Trial Court to be relevant or 
determinative of any of the issues between the parties. 
ARGUMENTS ADDRESSED IN BODY OF APPELLANT'S BRIEF WHICH ARE 
NOT SET FORTH ABOVE: 
20. Did the Trial Court err in refusing to recognize agreement 
made by respondent? 
No. See issue 11 above. 
21. Is the Trial Court a co-conspirator to defraud the federal 
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government by awarding the respondent assets in this matter? 
No. See issue 19 above. 
22. Can plaintiff's admitted statement be ignored? 
Yes. See issue 11 and issue 19 above. 
CONCLUSION 
The parties had a 19 year relationship, during which time they 
raised four children and pooled all of their assets. Don has 
attempted to appropriate those assets for himself, and the Trial 
Court has refused to allow him to do so. Instead, the Trial Court 
has imposed a constructive trust upon the parties and their assets, 
and has equitably divided them between the parties. 
Don, by this appeal, has asked the Court of Appeals to 
overturn the judgment of the Trial Court and award all of the 
property to him. He has not cited the record once in his brief. 
He has cited no statute nor any relevant case law to support any 
of his arguments. He has presented no argument at trial, (despite 
the entreaties of the Trial Court to do so) and no compelling 
argument here that the division of the property is inequitable, and 
that some other division would be more fair. He just wants it all. 
Don's position is inherently unfair, and in fact, shocking. 
Helen would be deprived of her share of her life's work, and the 
Trial Court correctly imposed this constructive trust to equitably 
divide the parties' assets to prevent the unjust enrichment which 
would result if Don were allowed to appropriate all of the property 
for himself. The division of the parties' assets by the Trial 
Court should stand, and Helen should be awarded her attorney's fees 
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incurred in this appeal. 
DATED this ]_0_ day of July, 1990. 
Ma 
ane Allen 
ttorney for Plaintiff/Respondent 
Helen Layton 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing 
Respondent's Brief to the Appellant, Don Layton, 220 Banks Court 
Salt Lake City, Utah 83102 this Jj_ day of July, 1990. 
% . . * - & & — . 
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Jane Allen, Bar #45 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
8 East 300 South, Suite 735 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(801) 355-1300 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OP UTAH 
HELEN LAYTON, ] 
Plaintiff, ] 
vs. ] 
DONALD LAYTON, ] 
Defendant. ] 
| FINDINGS OF FACT 
| AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
) Civil No. D83-3977 
I Judge David Young 
This matter was decided by the Utah Court of Appeals on July 
9, 1989. The Court remanded this matter to the trial court for 
further findings of fact and conclusions of law in accordance with 
the evidence presented at trial. The Appeals Court ruled that the 
parties1 relationship was not covered by the statute regarding 
common law marriage, but a number of other legal theories were 
suggested. The Plaintiff proposed her findings, and the Defendant 
responded. After considering the arguments of both parties, the 
court ordered that the theory of constructive trust be applied to 
this matter, and based upon the record herein and good cause 
appearing therefor, the Court makes the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The parties herein began living together in 1954, and lived 
together almost continuously until 1983, when this action was 
filed. 
— •; vz)T « A » 
2. The parties filed joint income taxes from 1954 until 1983. 
3. The parties pooled all of their income, which was 
exclusively from joint business endeavors, which were buying and 
selling real property, felling trees, demolition of buildings, sale 
of raspberries each summer. 
4. The parties owned no real property at the time their 
relationship began, and all real and personal property owned by 
them at the time of trial was purchased during the time they lived 
together and was purchased with joint funds. The relationship of 
the parties could be described as similar to a marriage, with the 
relationship being confidential, and with each party dependent upon 
the other for various services and emotional support during the 
time the relationship existed. 
5. The equitable distribution as rendered by the Court is 
supported by the principles of the parties' conduct, which created 
a constructive trust. 
6. A constructive trust is arises to prevent manifest 
injustice and can be applied to almost any circumstances, as set 
forth in CJS, Sec.142 as follows: 
Generally, any transaction may be the basis for creating a 
constructive trust where for any reason the defendant holds funds 
which in equity and good consience should be possessed by the 
plaintiff, and the forms and varieties of constructive trusts are 
practically without limit. 
7. In this matter, the parties lived as though they were 
married, and had considerable joint assets. A great injustice 
would occur if the defendant were allowed to retain all of the 
parties' assets, which represented the fruit of both parties1 
lifetime of work and effort. 
8. Accordingly, a constructive trust may be imposed in this 
matter, not necessarily because of the intention of the parties, 
but because the person holding title to the property would be 
unuustly enriched if he were permitted to keep the property. (See 
Doing vs. Riley, CA Fla., 176 F. 2d 449; Potter vs. Lindsay, 60 
N. W. 2d 133, 337 Mich. 404; Miller vs. Buecker. Comm. PI., 63 York 
Leg. Rec. 53; Copenhaver vs. Duncan, Comm. PI., 60 York Leg. Rec. 
105; McConnel vs. Dixon, 233 P. 2d 877, 68 Wyo. 301.) 
9. Utah has recognized the concept of constructive trusts, 
and has no statues barring the application of this theory in this 
matter. 
10. Their relationship and the divisions of the assets 
accumulated therein are governed by said trust whether in 
individual names or joint names. 
11. The Court further finds that matters related to property 
distribution are unchanged hereby. The Court followed equitable 
principles in dividing the property and orders that those findings 
and that distribution be set forth herein. 
12. From 1983 until June of 1987 the Defendant had complete 
control of the parties1 assets and he received all income thereon, 
and accordingly he should be responsible for all indebtedness, 
property taxes, and assessments which were levied on the property 
during that time that have not been paid by him. 
13. The parties raised four children, one of whom is 
handicapped and is in need of support beyond age 18. Danny, said 
child, is presently residing with the Plaintiff, and she is in need 
of support for his care and support in the sum of $200.00 per month 
until such time as he no longer resides with her. 
14. The Plaintiff did make the writing which states that "I 
hereby relinquish all claims to all property in the name of Don 
Layton and Helen Layton." 
15. The writing was made sometime in the 1970 fs, and an exact 
date is impossible to determine, as the writing is not dated and 
the parties1 testimony differs as to the approximate date. 
16. There is no evidence of consideration for the writing, 
and the property mentioned therein is not identified with enough 
particularity for the court to determine what property, if any, was 
being transferred. 
17. The parties did not later ratify the writing by 
transferring all of the jointly held real or personal property into 
the name of the Defendant in reliance thereon, or otherwise 
behaving as though the writing had validity. Instead, they 
continued their relationship as they had in the past. 
18. The Court finds the note signed by the Plaintiff stating, 
"I hereby relinquish all claim to all property in the name of Don 
Layton and Helen Layton" to be unsupported by consideration and 
further to have been ignored by the parties until the Defendant 
attempted to use it to his aadvantage in these proceedings. Thus, 
this Court finds the note to be a nullity and ignores its content. 
19. At the time of the filing of this action the parties1 
property, both real and personal, was essentially intact, and had, 
except for small sales, not been transferred to others or 
encumbered by either of them. 
Having made the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now 
makes the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The parties confidential relationship is best 
characterized as a constructive trust, 
2. All property acquired by the parties, whether in joint or 
separate name, has been equitably divided in an approximately equal 
division according to value, as set forth below. 
3. The parties to this action were the only beneficiaries of 
the constructive trust, and have been duly notified of this action, 
and sufficient evidence was obtained at trial to indicate a need 
to equitably divide the assets of the trust. 
4. The writing produced by the Defendant does not transfer 
any trust property to him, and is invalid, as it is not supported 
by consideration nor has it been later ratified by the parties. 
5. Accordingly, the personal and real property of the parties 
shall be equitably divided between them as follows: 
PERSONAL PROPERTY: 
6. The parties, along with their personal effects, owned, at 
the time of the parties' separation the following items all of 
which are presently in the possession of the Defendant: 
four motorcycles 
three pianos 
Yamaha Organ 
600 ounces of silver 
Train collection (est. value $10,000.00) 
Mechanics tools 
Carpenters tools 
Tree cutting tools 
Caterpillar tractor 
Road grader 
Dump truck 
Three pickup trucks 
Camper 
1959 Corvette 
Saab Automobile 
Gun collection 
Substantial miscellaneous personal property 
7. The Plaintiff shall retain the personal property in her 
possession, and the Defendant shall awarded the personal property 
in his possession, with the party retaining an item to be 
responsible for all indebtedness thereon. However, there is a 
substantial inequity in this division, and the Plaintiff shall be 
awarded the parcels of real property numbered 23-873-1 and 23-874, 
page number 64 and 59 of Exhibit A as her sole and separate 
property, subject to no claim by the Defendant. 
8. The Plaintiff shall be awarded all personal property and 
fixtures which is inside or on the real property awarded to her. 
REAL PROPERTY: 
9. The real property of the parties is extensive, and it is 
divided as set forth in exhibit A, which is attached hereto. 
PAST DUE PROPERTY TAXES, SEWER ASSESSMENTS, AND WATER BILLS: 
10. The Defendant shall be responsible for all property taxes, 
sewer assessments, and water bills and any other unpaid expenses 
for the property awarded to the Plaintiff until it was transferred 
to the Plaintiff's name alone, which occurred in July of 1987, and 
those debts should be paid by Helen being awarded a lien against 
parcel no.17-4963, page 50 of Exhibit A. The amount of said lien 
remains to be determined, and if the parties cannot agree as to the 
amount, either party may move the court for a determination of the 
amount of said lien- Said lien shall be paid whenever the property 
is sold, or the Plaintiff may foreclose upon her lien if she so 
desires. 
CHILD SUPPORT: 
11. The Defendant shall pay child support to the Plaintiff 
inlthe sum of $200-00 per month for so long as he resides with the 
Plaintiff. 
12. Both parties shall maintain health and accident insurance 
for Daniel so long as it is available through his or her 
employment, and they shall share equally any medical, dental, 
orthodontic or optical expenses incurred by him which are not 
covered by insurance. 
13. The Plaintiff shall be awarded the custody of Daniel, 
subject to the Defendant's reasonable rights of visitation. 
SIGN ALL PAPERS: 
14. The Defendant shall sign a quit-claim deed for each parcel 
awarded to the Plaintiff, and she shall do the same, within two 
weeks of the decision of this Court. If the Defendant should fail 
to do so, the Plaintiff may petition the Court and have the Court 
execute the documents, and the Defendant shall be responsible for 
her attorney's fees required in doing so. 
ATTORNEY'S FEES: 
15. Each party should be responsible for his or her own 
attorney's fees and costs. Should the Defendant again appeal this 
matter, he should be responsible for the Plaintiff's reasonable 
attorney's fees and costs incurred on said appeal, should the 
Plaintiff be successful. 
RESTRAINING ORDER: 
16. The Defendant shall be permanently restrained from 
harassing, threatening, or bothering the Plaintiff or her tenants. 
DATED this day of , 1989. 
BY THE COURT: 
David Young 
District Court Judge 
Approved by: 
Donald W. Layton 
Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Decree of Divorce to Donald W. Layton, 3801 Villa Drive, 
Salt Lake City, Utah, 84109, and 220 Banks Court, Salt Lake City, 
Utah 84102 postage prepaid this f day of Lkc^^^— / 1989. 
\I<A Ctfh^ 
i / 
Jane Allen, Bar #45 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
8 East 300 South, Suite 735 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(801) 355-1300 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
HELEN LAYTON, ] 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DONALD LAYTON, ] 
Defendant. ] 
| ORDER OF DISSOLUTION OF 
I CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST 
| Civil No. D83-3977 
1 Judge David Young 
This matter was decided by the Utah Court of Appeals on July 
9, 1989. The Court remanded this matter to the trial court for 
further findings of fact and conclusions of law in accordance with 
the evidence presented at trial. The Appeals Court ruled that the 
parties1 relationship was not covered by the statute regarding 
common law marriage, but a number of other legal theories were 
suggested. The Plaintiff proposed her findings, and the Defendant 
responded. After considering the arguments of both parties the 
Court has determined that the theory of constructive trust applies 
to this matter, and based upon the record herein and good cause 
appearing therefor, and having made and entered its findings of 
fact and conclusions of law, it is hereby ordered, adjudged, and 
decreed: 
DECREE OF DISSOLUTION 
1. The confidentail relationship of the parties is hereby 
characterized as a constructive trust, and said constructive trust 
created by the parties is hereby dissolved. 
2. All property acquired by the parties, whether in joint or 
separate name, has been equitably divided in an approximately equal 
division according to value, as set forth herein. 
3. The parties to this action were the only beneficiaries of 
the "constructive trust," and have been duly notified of this 
action, and sufficient evidence was obtained at trial to indicate 
a need to equitably divide the assets of the trust. 
4. The writing produced by the Defendant does not transfer 
any trust property to him, and is invalid, as it is not supported 
by consideration nor has it been later ratified by the parties. 
5. Accordingly, the personal and real property of the parties 
shall be equitably divided between them as follows: 
PERSONAL PROPERTY: 
6. The parties, along with their personal effects, owned, at 
the time of the parties1 separation the following items all of 
which are presently in the possession of the Defendant: 
four motorcycles 
three pianos 
Yamaha Organ 
600 ounces of silver 
Train collection (est. value $10,000.00) 
Mechanics tools 
Carpenters tools 
Tree cutting tools 
Caterpillar tractor 
Road grader 
Dump truck 
Three pickup trucks 
Camper 
1959 Corvette 
Saab Automobile 
Gun collection 
Substantial miscellaneous personal property 
7. The Plaintiff shall retain the personal property in her 
possession, and the Defendant shall awarded the personal property 
in his possession, with the party retaining an item to be 
responsible for all indebtedness thereon. However, there is a 
substantial inequity in this division, and the Plaintiff shall be 
awarded the parcels of real property numbered 23-873-1 and 23-874, 
page number 64 and 59 of Exhibit A as her sole and separate 
property, subject to no claim by the Defendant. 
8. The Plaintiff shall be awarded all personal property and 
fixtures which is inside or on the real property awarded to her. 
REAL PROPERTY: 
9. The real property of the parties is extensive, and it is 
divided as set forth in exhibit A, which is attached hereto. 
PAST DUE PROPERTY TAXES, SEWER ASSESSMENTS, AND WATER BILLS: 
10. The Defendant shall be responsible for all property taxes, 
sewer assessments, and water bills and any other unpaid expenses 
for the property awarded to the Plaintiff until it was transferred 
to the Plaintiff's name alone, which occurred in July of 1987, and 
those debts should be paid by Helen being awarded a lien against 
parcel no.17-4963, page 50 of Exhibit A. The amount of said lien 
remains to be determined, and if the parties cannot agree as to the 
amount, either party may move the court for a determination of the 
amount of said lien. Said lien shall be paid whenever the property 
is sold, or the Plaintiff may foreclose upon her lien if she so 
desires. 
CHILD SUPPORT: 
11. The Defendant shall pay child support to the Plaintiff 
inlthe sum of $200.00 per month for so long as he resides with the 
Plaintiff. 
12. Both parties shall maintain health and accident insurance 
for Daniel so long as it is available through his or her 
employment, and they shall share equally any medical, dental, 
orthodontic or optical expenses incurred by him which are not 
covered by insurance. 
13. The Plaintiff shall be awarded the custody of Daniel, 
subject to the Defendant's reasonable rights of visitation. 
SIGN ALL PAPERS: 
14. The Defendant shall sign a quit-claim deed for each parcel 
awarded to the Plaintiff, and she shall do the same, within two 
weeks of the decision of this Court. If the Defendant should fail 
to do so, the Plaintiff may petition the Court and have the Court 
execute the documents, and the Defendant shall be responsible for 
her attorney's fees required in doing so. 
ATTORNEY'S FEES: 
15. Each party should be responsible for his or her own 
attorney's fees and costs. Should the Defendant again appeal this 
matter, he should be responsible for the Plaintiff's reasonable 
attorney's fees and costs incurred on said appeal, should the 
Plaintiff be successful. 
***** 
RESTRAINING ORDER: 
16. The Defendant shall be permanently restrained from 
harassing, threatening, or bothering the Plaintiff or her tenants. 
DATED this day of , 1989. 
BY THE COURT: 
David Young 
District Court Judge 
Approved by: 
Donald W. Layton 
Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law to 
Donald W. Layton, 3801 Villa Drive, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84109, 
and 22 0 Banks Court, Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 postage prepaid 
this _f day of December, 1989. 
Jane Allen, Bar #45 
8 E. 300 S., Suite 735 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(801)355-1300 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
HELEN LAYTON, 
Plaintiff 
vs. 
DONALD LAYTON, 
Defendant 
and Respondent, ] 
and Appellant, ] 
) Court of Appeals No: 
| 900019-CA 
i Previous Appeal No: 
) 870378-CA 
i Oral Argument Priority 14(b) 
RESPONDENTS AFFIDAVIT OF ATTORNEY'S FEES 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE) 
Comes now Jane Allen, attorney for Respondent, after being 
duly sworn on oath, who deposes and states as follows: 
1. I am the attorney for Helen Layton, Respondent in this 
matter. 
2. I have performed the following services in responding to 
the Appellant's brief at my normal hourly rate of $75.00 per hour: 
Research of case law: 3 hours 
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Writing brief: 10 hours 
Preparing for and making oral argument (in the future) 
3 hours 
Total: 16 hours at $75.00 per hour = $1200.00 
Copies: ^/S - 7-6 
Grand total i Ij^^lb 
DATED this JQ_ daY o f July, 1990. 
My 
Jane Allen fa
.Attorney for Respondent 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this * ? ' day of^July, 1990. 
Wsga ^expires: ^<C 
J & Commission O 
If ' Expires Jun» *, 1392 
I JUDITH TERRY 
\\ a £is« Broadway #735 
aAtf> Salt Lak» City, ,£. 
/ 'Notary Public , /,' . f _ 
/ Residing in : ^jz^^l c* *-•*<_„ L s-*^-^ 
i/ / 
> 
UT 84101 
£ o? 
,\\ 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing 
Affidavit to the Appellant, Don Layton, 220 Banks Court 
Salt Lake City, Utah 83102 this Jl_ day of July, 1990. 
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